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SPECIAL SUBCHAPTER S SITUATIONS-
REGULATIONS RUN RAMPANT
ELLIOTT K. BRAWvRmAN t
Although subchapter S was designed to free a small business
which needs to incorporate from any additional tax burden,1 it did not
purport, even for tax purposes, to equate shareholders of the electing
corporation with the partners of a partnership. Many differences be-
tween the two are apparent: 2
(1) Principals of a tax option corporation may qualify as "em-
ployees" under pension and profit sharing plans.3
(2) With the exception of certain capital gains discussed later,
the income of a tax option corporation does not retain its corporate
character in the hands of its shareholders.4
(3) Limitations on deductible amounts and other rules applicable
to ordinary business corporations apply for the most part to tax option
corporations.-
(4) As with corporations in general, liquidation or redemption
remains a taxable event,' and the character of the gain, if any, is not
dependent upon the nature of the underlying assets.7
t B.S. University of Pennsylvania, 1956; LL.B. Temple University, 1959; LL.M.
New York University, 1960. Member, New York and Pennsylvania Bars. Member,
Blank, Rudenko, Klaus & Rome, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Attorney Advisor, Tax
Court of the United States, 1960-1962.
I S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
2 Proposed amendments to the 1954 Code, never enacted, would have made the
two virtually identical by taxing qualifying corporations under subchapter K of the
Code. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118-19 (1954).
3 
INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-07.
4 Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 651, 661 (distributable net income concept
applicable to trusts).
G E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170(b) (2) (limitation on charitable contribu-
tions), 178 (amount of bonus depreciation). See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 48(e),
which makes investment credit limitation applicable at the shareholder level. It is
not clear whether the electing corporation is a "new" taxpayer for purposes of § 481
(requiring adjustments to prevent distortion upon change in accounting methods).
See E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448, 459 (1965).
0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331. Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 731. How-
ever, a corporation which has been a tax option corporation from its inception will
generally be able to obtain substantial relief through a one-month liquidation. See
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 333.
7 Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 736, 751.
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Despite such intended differences, passage of subchapter S was
clearly designed to offer equality of tax treatment to tax option cor-
porations and partnerships through two essential principles:
(1) Taxation of an option corporation's income to the share-
holders when earned, with consequent tax free withdrawal of these
earnings; 8 and
(2) Deductibility of operating losses at the shareholder level."
This article will examine the extent to which even these limited
objectives have been accomplished. Knowledge of the basic statutory
requirements for tax option status will be assumed. Our concern will
be with the more esoteric, often obscure, ramifications of certain re-
quirements and the difficulties taxpayers confront in satisfying them.
I. QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENT OF ONE CLASS OF STOCK
Section 1371(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code defines a
"small business corporation," as one which, among other requirements,
does not "have more than one class of stock." Although the origin
of this limitation is completely unexplained in the committee reports
accompanying the 1958 act, the 1954 committee reports, accompanying
proposed predecessor legislation, claim simplicity of procedure as the
motivation: "If this requirement were not made, undistributed current
earnings could not be taxed to the shareholders without great
complications." 0
It is nowhere suggested that this requirement was meant to
insure that all shareholders be active participants in the corporate
business. Indeed, the legislation ultimately enacted in 1958 con-
spicuously omitted the requirement, found in the proposed 1954 legis-
lation, that each shareholder of an electing corporation must be
"actively engaged in the conduct of the business of the corporation-
i.e., such shareholders must all occupy managerial positions." 11
The "one class" limitation is thus of humble origin, its genesis
offering no suggestion of the importance and emphasis now assigned
to it by the Internal Revenue Service. For the IRS, there is more
than "one class of stock" if there is any "difference" among stock-
holders, even one having no relationship to computations. Thus for
the Service, the requirement of "one class of stock" has resulted in
development of a novel application of the familiar debt-equity theory,
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1373; see text accompanying note 60 infra.
9 INT. RFy. CODE OF 1954, § 1374; see text accompanying note 75 infra.
lo S. RF,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1954).
11 Ibid.
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again restrictive of subchapter S eligibility. A section designed for
"simplicity" has therefore generated a complicated and highly con-
ceptual dispute.
For example, Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1 (8) provides:
If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are
not identical with respect to the rights and interest which they
convey in the control, profits, and assets of the corporation,
then the corporation is considered to have more than one
class of stock. Thus, a difference as to voting rights, divi-
dend rights, or liquidation preferences of outstanding stock
will disqualify a corporation. However, if two or more
groups of shares are identical in every respect except that
each group has the right to elect members of the board of
directors in a number proportionate to the number of shares
in each group, they are considered one class of stock. If an
instrument purporting to be a debt obligation is actually
stock, it will constitute a second class of stock.
Presumably, the next to last sentence of this regulation would
protect the corporation in a situation where advances, although con-
sidered stock, are exactly in proportion to stockholdings. However,
once there is a disproportion, although this circumstance might actually
be helpful to the taxpayer on the question of debt versus equity, the
regulation would hold that a second (disqualifying) class stock has
come into existence.
In a controversial and far reaching 1963 ruling,' the Internal
Revenue Service demonstrated the extreme to which it will advance
this interpretation. Here there was of record only one class of
stock-voting common stock issued upon the incorporation of a
partnership consisting of eight active and two limited partners. As
might be expected, the shareholders entered into an agreement pursuant
to which the inactive shareholders granted the active ones an ir-
revocable proxy to vote their stock. Eligibility for subchapter S was
denied; since only some of the shareholders could "vote," i.e., direct
policy, two classes of stock existed.
Not only did this ruling on its facts jeopardize conventional busi-
ness practices-voting trusts, executive committees, loan agreements
with voting restrictions, etc.-its broad language went beyond the
specific facts and condemned "any other type of voting control device
or arrangement . . . which has the effect of modifying the voting
rights of part of the stock so that particular shares possess dispropor-
tionate voting power as compared to the dividend rights or liquidation
12 Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 Cum. BuLt. 341.
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rights of those shares and as compared to the voting, dividend and
liquidation rights of the other shares of stock." '
Although the response of the business community and of legal
commentators has been dismay, 4 it should be observed in defense of
the IRS that the ruling while seemingly harsh in the case of a revocable
or short term proxy, is arguably justifiable in the case of an irrevocable
proxy. Furthermore the Service's position does have the merit of
treating identical restrictions identically, without regard to whether
they have been created by corporate charter or by agreement.
Nonetheless the "substance over form" approach here is question-
able because of the doubtful effectiveness of such stockholders' agree-
ments against outsiders unaware of their contents 1r or even against new
shareholders. In addition to the absence of support in the legislative
history for the Service's position, the test enunciated in the 1963 ruling
is uncomfortably similar to that which has been utilized in determining
whether certain unincorporated "associations" are to be taxed as
corporations. 6 Any such equation is untenable. There is nothing in
the statute itself' 7 or in the legislative history which even suggests
that an association taxable as a corporation is per se disqualified from
electing subchapter S treatment.'"
Another aspect of the Service's sweeping attack upon apparent
"one class of stock" situations is found in its novel treatment of the
typical debt versus equity problem: where purported "debt" is found
to be equity, that equity per se constitutes a "second class of stock" and
subchapter S status is unavailable. Thus in Catalina Homes, Inc.,9
already somewhat of a cause celebre, a single principal owned fifty-one
of the one hundred shares of corporate stock. The principal's wife
and children retained fourteen shares subject to a voting trust agree-
ment whereby the principal's wife and children gave to him, as voting
trustee, the exclusive right to vote their stock for a period of ten years.
Upon the sale of the remaining thirty-five shares to an outsider, a
shareholder's agreement was executed including certain terms and
13 Id. at 342.
14The ruling has been soundly criticized. Notes, 20 TAX L. REv. 391, 392-94
(1964) ; 22 J. TAXATION 166, 168 (1965).
Ibid.
16 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Helvering v.
Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935).
17 Section 1371(a) defines a "small business corporation" as a domestic corpora-
tion which meets certain requirements. Section 7701 (a) (3) provides: "The term
'corporation' includes associations . .. ."
18 Such election might indeed be advisable in a doubtful case, although there is the
immensely practical problem of the effect of filing the election and the possibility of
underscoring the problem. The result with regard to "professional corporations"
poses an interesting question.
19 23 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 1361 (1964).
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conditions concerning corporate management and the transferability
of corporate stock. The two principals then made loans to the cor-
poration, not in proportion to their stockholdings, bearing interest at
five percent and payable from time to time at the discretion of the
board of directors-"dividends," however, could not be paid until the
payment of all corporate debts. The two principals then made sub-
stantial "advances" to the corporation. The IRS contended, and the
court agreed, that the purported debt was actually equity.20 But then
the court in a mere memorandum opinion proceeded to accept the
Service's subchapter S contention: the loan treated as stock was a priori
a second class of stock.
Lest the last sentence of Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1 (8), appear
to have gained judicial confirmation it should be noted that the tax-
payer appears not to have specifically challenged the validity of the
regulation, nor has any taxpayer to date done so in court. Thus the
Service has not been required to assume the unenviable burden of
establishing that the standards and reasons for classifying alleged debt
as equity are germane to determining whether such equity differs ma-
terially from investment formally identified as equity.
Even the Catalina Homes court felt compelled to question the
reasonableness of at least one aspect of the 1963 ruling, the "voting
stock" language, again still untested in the courts. Although the court
refused to rule upon the government's contention that stock in voting
trusts constitutes a second class of stock because of its loss of voting
power,2' the court by dictum did "deem it appropriate to note our
reservations as to whether these arguments represent a reasonable
interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions and the intent of
Congress in enacting Subchapter S." 22 Such language offers hope
for taxpayers in the further litigation which obviously is to be
expected.23  The severe interpretations of the Service in this area also
lead to perplexing questions with regard to corporations financed by
bank loans guaranteed by their shareholders. In one recent case,
Murphy Logging,24 the Service successfully contended that such loans
were in substance loans by the bank to the shareholders who, in turn,
invested the moneys in the corporation. Although this was not a
.20 Id. at 1367; accord, Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.
1963) & cases cited therein; Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159
(6th Cir. 1956) (affirming 23 T.C. 408 (1954)), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957);
Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).21 It also avoided deciding whether the voting trusts were shareholders "other
than individuals" which would violate the requirements of § 1371(a.) (2) of the Code.
See text accompanying note 42 infra.
2223 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1368.
28 See Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
24 Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 794 (D. Ore. 1965).
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subchapter S case, there would appear to be no reason why the doc-
trine of this case, together with the Catalina principle, could not affect
the subchapter S area. One writer has recently pointed out that these
decisions together place the small business corporation on the horns of
a dilemma no matter which way its operations are financed.25 Although
the same writer expresses the view that the Murphy Logging case will
be very narrowly applied, it is understood that field agents have been
applying this principle and it is submitted that this is an area which
taxpayers must tread with extreme caution.
II. TERMINATION OF SUBCHAPTER S ELECTION
During the course of a taxable year a corporation may discover
that its election of tax option status either was ill advised from the
outset or, in light of the then current operating situation, will not prove
beneficial. At this point the shareholders must consider, from a long
range point of view, whether the status should nevertheless be continued
or whether it should be terminated.
The simplest means of termination is through filing with the
Commissioner a statement of revocation accompanied by the consent
of all shareholders.2" This method of termination, however, under
both the statute and the regulations 1 7 is effective for a given taxable
year only if filed within the first month of that year. Otherwise, the
termination is effective only for the succeeding year. The statute and
the regulations further provide that, in any event, the termination, even
if made in the first month, cannot be effective for the first year of the
election.2
The other methods of termination " do affect the taxable status
for the year in which the termination occurs even though the terminat-
ing event occurs after the first month of the year. These methods are
brought about by events which constitute "termination"-a statutory
phrasing which might suggest that termination was considered an un-
favorable event which occurs despite the intentions of the taxpayer.
2523 J. TAXATION 194 (1965).
26The purpose of the consent requirement is to prevent a tax decision by less
than all shareholders which will affect all shareholders. A shareholders' agreement
providing for consent is likely to prove ineffective in this situation. If any shareholder
violates his agreement (either by refusing to consent to termination or by effecting
termination where none is intended), the corporation or nonviolating shareholders
apparently could not assert against the government that termination is nevertheless
effected. Since the statute does not recognize such agreements, the nonviolating share-
holders would probably be limited to an action for damages against the violator.
27 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e) (2) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(c) (1959).
28 Ibid. Because of the availability of other means of termination, it would seem
that this provision is of little practical significance.
29INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1372(e) (1), (3), (4), (5). Paragraphs (1), (4)
and (5) are not discussed in detail in this paper.
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In practice, however, it has generally been accepted that these methods
of termination may be used affirmatively by a taxpayer who seeks to
discontinue an election but finds that it is too late in the year to do so
by revocation. 0 For example, after the first month of a taxable year,
the taxpayer may purposely transfer certain shares to a trust or to a
new shareholder, or he may formally create a second class of stock.
Cautious practitioners, however, are aware of the possibility that ter-
minations deliberately created in this manner may not be recognized by
the Commissioner if they are lacking in substance, for example, where
the number of shares transferred to the trust or to a nonconsenting
shareholder is nominal.1
The regulations dealing with termination by means other than
revocation 32 require that notification be given to the Commissioner of
the termination. Where the termination is unintended, however, the
necessity of such a requirement is difficult to see since the Com-
missioner may, in any event, assert that the election has been ter-
minated, while it is hardly punitive to refuse a taxpayer the right to
terminate where he did not desire termination. Where the termination
is deliberate, however, it is obviously better practice to notify the
Commissioner, although there do not appear to be any cases or rulings
in which the Commissioner has refused to recognize a termination
simply because of failure to file the notice.3
The most perplexing aspect of termination occurs where the
termination is not only unintended but is also unknown. This is most
likely to occur in a situation like that in Catalina Homes where the
taxpayer in good faith might not even suspect that it has violated the
"one class of stock" requirement. Here, disaster may result from a
belated assertion by the IRS that the status has been terminated
ab initio. Assume a corporation which in the first year of its existence
elects tax option status. In that first year a portion of the initial capital
is supplied in the form of shareholder loans or shareholder guarantees
of bank loans. In subsequent periods, or perhaps even later in the
same year, these loans (or apparent loans) are repaid. Several years
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6707, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL.
316, as amended, T.D. 6841, 1965 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 34, at 35, suggests that the
Commissioner is fully aware that an election may be terminated deliberately by a
means other than revocation.
31 Although the regulations make no reference to such a possibility, ample author-
ity is readily available to justify IRS's assertion of such a result. See, e.g., Com-
missioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S.
473, 477-78 (1940).
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (1), (3)-(5) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6707, 1964-1
Cum. BuLL. 316, as amended, T.D. 6841, 1965 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 34, at 35.
3SCompare T.I.R. 702, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 154, where, after much uncertainty
about the matter, the Service ruled that the failure to file form 966 was not fatal to
a plan of liquidation.
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later, the Commissioner asserts that the initial loans really constituted
a second class of stock and that the election was therefore either invalid
from its inception or terminated in the year it began. Assume further
that several years later the Service's position is sustained in litigation.
Although an election normally, even if terminated, can be reinstated as
a matter of right five years after termination, 4 the taxpayer, unaware
of termination, never considered a new election. Moreover, since the
regulations 35 provide that an election has a "continuing effect and
need not be renewed annually," strategic considerations would dictate
against a taxpayer filing an "election" the year after he learned of the
possible but contested termination. Of course, once the issue is raised
by the Service, the taxpayer should file a new "election" each year
thereafter although he is still contending that the initial election remains
effective. Strategy and prudence, thus, lead the taxpayer in different
directions. To free the taxpayer from this dilemma, the law should
be amended to provide that wherever the taxpayer, in good faith, does
not believe that the election has been terminated and proceeds on the
assumption that it is still effective, the status is automatically restored
in the first year in which the terminating cause is no longer operative.
3
1
The above mentioned five year rule thus remains available and
effective to prevent the principal abuse at which it is directed: indis-
criminate, purposeful terminations of tax option status. The statute
even today grants the Commissioner discretion to reinstate the tax
option status, upon application by the taxpayer, at an earlier date.
8 7
Furthermore the regulations explicitly recognize that in some instances
the five year rule will work an undue hardship and, accordingly, pro-
vision is made that: "Consent to the new election will ordinarily be
denied unless it can be shown that the event causing the termination
was not reasonably within the control of the corporation or share-
holders having a substantial interest in the corporation, and was not
part of a plan to terminate the election in which plan such shareholders
participated." 8
However, the IRS nowhere suggests that the above dilemma of
inadvertent termination can be considered an event "not reasonably
within the control of the corporation or shareholders" even if share-
holders acted in good faith.
The typical "events" to which this regulation appears to refer
include the death of a shareholder and the attendant transfer of his
84 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(f).
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(c) (1959).
30 Quite possibly, especially in view of the high degree of restrictive regulations
in this area, this result could be accomplished by regulation.
37 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(f).
3 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-5(a) (1959).
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stock to a nonqualifying shareholder. Although the statute itself per-
mits an estate to be a shareholder,39 the executor, like any new share-
holder, is required by the regulations to file his consent within thirty
days after his qualification 40 or, in any event within thirty days follow-
ing the close of the corporation's taxable year in which the estate
became a shareholder.4' However, suppose the will requires that the
stock be distributed to one or more trusts-nonqualifying share-
holders-even though the trustee is able and willing to distribute the
stock immediately to the beneficiary.42 There are rulings-apparently
unpublished-which hold that this falls within the status of an "event
not reasonably within the control of the corporation." ' These rulings
appear to be eminently fair except in the unlikely situation where the
shareholder in creating the trust deliberately planned to cause a
termination after his death.
However, even though some relief is granted in the case of such
trusts, reinstatement of the election cannot take place until the year
after the termination, unless the distribution to the trust has occurred in
the first month of the taxable year and, even then, only if within that
month the taxpayer has been able to obtain the required approval. It
is unclear whether he could obtain such approval after the fact.
Good planning, therefore, demands that where an executor desires to
distribute stock thorugh a trust to a qualifying beneficiary he should
obtain approval of the Commissioner in the year prior to the year of
distribution and then make the distribution through the trust in the
first month of the corporation's succeeding taxable year. This should
permit the corporation, with the beneficiary as a shareholder, to file a
new election for the then current taxable year without any interruption
in tax option status.
Such planning would not, of course, handle the situation where
the trustee was forbidden, or felt it unwise, to distribute the stock to
the beneficiary. Here apparently the parties will have to suffer dis-
qualification at least so long as the trustee holds the stock. For once
89 INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 1371 (a) (2).
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372- (3) (b) (1959).
41 Here again the regulations appear to impose an unwarranted burden on the
taxpayer. Suppose that a shareholder dies on the last day of a corporation's taxable
year. Literally, the regulation would appear to require that the consent be filed within
thirty days of that date regardless of when the executor qualified. Suppose there is
a will contest or some other event which leaves the estate without an executor for
thirty days. Does this mean the election is per se terminated?
42 Apparently, there would still be a technical termination since momentarily the
trustee would have held the stock, albeit only for the purpose of conveying to the
beneficiary. Suppose the executor, with the trustee's approval, sold the stock to the
beneficiary for the latter's promisory note, which note was then given to the trustee.
The trustee could then distribute his own note to the beneficiary.
4 3 Tax Management, Portfolio No. 60.
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the fault lies not with the regulations, but with the statute itself-
apparently the requirement eliminating a trust from the class of
qualifying shareholders is a vestige of the former "active management"
rule." This provision intrudes in a most unwarranted fashion on
sound estate planning without at the same time really correcting any
abuse. At present the only means of avoiding this difficulty would
seem to be a form of shareholders' agreement under which the cor-
poration or the surviving shareholders could require the estate to sell
its stock whenever a transfer in trust was contemplated.45 Of course
the unfavorable effect of trust ownership can legitimately be delayed-
provided that the executor is agreeable-until the termination of actual
administration of the estate. Let taxpayers not conclude that this
offers a means of indefinitely postponing the problem. The recent
Tax Court decision in Old Virginia Brick Co.,4" indicates that the
period of delay must be reasonable. The court there held that the
unduly prolonged administration of an estate (apparently, about
eighteen years at the time of the tax option election) necessitated
treatment of the corporate stock, for subchapter S purposes, as though
it were actually owned by a testamentary trust. The result, although
perhaps justified on the facts of this case, is astonishing. However,
the basic principle there enunciated is well supported by existing case
law 4 7 and regulations.4"
III. WITIH[DRAWAL OF CORPORATE EARNINGS
A principal reason for electing tax option status is to gain tax
treatment for corporate shareholders similar to that accorded partners.
Shareholders of a tax option corporation are thus taxed on their
pro rata share of corporate earnings whether distributed or not.49
Where some portion of corporate earnings are actually distributed
during the course of a taxable year, the regulations provide that such
earnings, to the extent of the current year's earnings and profits, are
considered dividends when distributed.5" The amount of the cor-
poration's taxable income not distributed during the year is taxed as
a dividend, pro rata, to the corporate shareholders on the last day
of the year as though distributed on that date.5 1
44 See the discussion concerning the "one class of stock" requirement, p. 681 supra.
4 5 But see note 26 mipra.
4644 T.C. 724 (1965).
4 7 Josephine Stewart, 16 T.C. 1, aff'd, 196 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1952); Marian
Caratan, 14 T.C. 934 (1950).
48 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959); Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1956).
49 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1373(b).
50 Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1(d) (1959). Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a).
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(a) (1) (1959).
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The scheme outlined above clearly permits a corporation and its
shareholders to elect, to some degree, the year in which the corporate
earnings will be taxed to the shareholders. If the corporation's taxable
year ends on a date different from that of its shareholders, 52 current
distributions might fall in one taxable year while the "deemed dis-
tributed" earnings were taxed in another year." It is important to
note that the regulations 54 interpret the statute as pertaining only to
those persons who are shareholders on the last day of the taxable year
of the corporation. In marked contrast to the rules governing sale
of partnership interests " it would, therefore, appear possible for a
shareholder to sell his stock prior to the end of the year (generally at
capital gains rates) and avoid tax on undistributed corporate income.
This would clearly require price adjustments to be made with an
unrelated buyer.
Recognizing that the statute offers a fertile area for tax planning,
especially but not exclusively, within a family group, the regulations
provide:
A donee or purchaser of stock in the corporation is not con-
sidered a shareholder unless such stock is acquired in a bona
fide transaction and the donee or purchaser is the real owner
of such stock. The circumstances, not only as of the time of
the purported transfer but also during the periods preceding
and following it, will be taken into consideration in deter-
mining the bona fides of the transfer. Transactions between
members of a family will be closely scrutinized."
In addition to this regulation, the would be tax planner in this
area must hurdle the provisions" permitting the Commissioner to
allocate dividends to other members of a family group--rather than
only to a single shareholder-to reflect the value of a particular share-
52 This can easily be arranged because there is no provision requiring tax option
corporations to have the same taxable year as their shareholders. Compare INT. Rxv.
CODE OIF 1954, § 706(b), with respect to taxable years of partnerships. Compare § 63
of the Omnibus Tax Bill of 1965, introduced in the first session of the present Congress.
H.R. 11450, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). This provision was not included in the bill
passed by the Senate early this year. H.R. 9883, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
53 The import of the provision that both distributed and undistributed income shall
be treated "as a dividend" is not clear, since § 1375 (b) provides that for purposes of
the dividends received credit, (INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 34 (repealed for years after
1964) ), the retirement income credit, § 37, and the one hundred dollar exclusion, § 116,
the distributions are not considered dividends. Perhaps, it is support for the ruling
that subchapter S income is not includable in compuiting self-employment tax. Rev.
Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 Cum. Bui.. 225.
54 Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(a) (2) (1959).
55 
INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 706(c) (2).
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1 (a) (2) (1959).
57 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(c). The statute deals with shifting income
among shareholders. Suppose a father rendered services to a corporation in which
he owns no shares and from which he draws no salary. May this section be invoked
by the IRS?
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holder's services.' 8 Apart from these restrictions, a timely gift pro-
gram may achieve substantial income shifting. 9
Since corporate earnings are taxed to the shareholder whether
distributed or not, a companion part of the statute6 o quite logically
provides in essence that a shareholder may withdraw previously taxed
but undistributed income without suffering further dividend conse-
quences. However, the regulations 61 provide that this "benefit" of
nondividend distribution is "personal" and cannot "in any manner"
be transferred to another. While superficially this provision might
seem equitable in view of the fact that the buying shareholder has
never been taxed on these earnings, it is nevertheless true that he has
in effect paid for such earnings. The proper planning technique, if
permitted by the corporate working capital position, would provide
for the selling shareholder first to withdraw the amount of earnings
he is permitted to withdraw tax free followed by sale of the stock at
a reduced price.62 Alternatively, of course, a shareholder might follow
the traditional approach and sell a lesser number of shares while
having the balance of his shares redeemed by the corporation.63 While
this procedure occasionally will not produce the desired results in the
ordinary case,64 it should be effective here because even a nonqualifying
redemption should not be treated as a dividend to the extent of pre-
viously taxed but undistributed earnings.
One vital question not specifically answered by the provisions re-
lating to distribution of previously taxed income is the status of an
existing shareholder who acquires additional shares which bear a
portion of undistributed income. The apparent sense of the regu-
lations 65 would be to disallow nondividend distribution treatment with
respect to any shares acquired after particular undistributed income
58 See Henry D. Duarte, 44 T.C. 193 (1965). The abuse here was patent, and
the court simply refused to find a bona fide transfer to young children. Although the
father reduced his salary after the transfer, the case relies more upon the regulation
than upon the specific statute, § 1375(c).
59 Similar planning is not available with respect to losses. They are pro rated
according to the period for which the stock is held. ITT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374
(c) (1).
60 IrT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(d).
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(e) (1959).
2 Of course, such distribution must be in cash or else, pursuant to Regulation
1.1373-1(d), it will not be considered a dividend distribution for purposes of reducing
undistributed taxable income. Therefore, if necessary, the corporation should borrow
on existing assets rather than make a property distribution.
6 3 Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
64 Suppose, for example, that the selling shareholder is required by conditions of
the business to remain as an officer or employee; or, suppose the withdrawing share-
holder to be the father of a continuing shareholder to whom he gave some stock within
the past ten years. In these cases, because of the application of the family attribution
rules, the redemption would not constitute a complete termination under § 302(b) (3)
and therefore would probably not qualify for capital gains treatment.
65 See note 61 sipra and accompanying text.
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was earned. Conversely, there is the question of the amount which
may be withdrawn as a "nondividend distribution" by a shareholder
who sells some, but not all, of his stock. Here it would seem that the
permissible withdrawal should not be correspondingly reduced.
A yet more disturbing problem introduced into this area by the
regulations relates to the nature of previously taxed but undistributed
income after termination of tax option status. The regulations pro-
vide: "If an election is terminated under Section 1372(e), the cor-
poration may not, during the first taxable year to which the termination
applies or during any subsequent taxable year, distribute previously
taxed income of taxable years prior to the termination as a nondividend
distribution pursuant to this section [1375]." 66
Again, there does not appear to be any support for this position
either in the statute itself or in the legislative history. Quite to the
contrary, the general purpose of the legislation suggests that Congress
intended to permit a shareholder to withdraw earnings tax free after
they had once been taxed. While the termination of tax option status
prevents the shareholder from so doing with respect to future profits,
there is no reason why it should so affect past profits. This problem
is further complicated by a subsequent provision that: "If a new
election is made subsequent to a termination under Section 1372(e)
of a prior election, a shareholder's net share of previously taxed income
is determined solely by reference to taxable years which are subject to
the new election." 67
Even granting, for argument's sake, the validity of the rule pre-
venting tax free withdrawal of previously taxed earnings while tax
option status is ineffective, it is hard to justify preventing tax free
withdrawal once the election is reinstated. Taken literally, the last
mentioned provision of the regulations would apply even in the case
earlier discussed of a distribution to a trustee for immediate redis-
tribution to the beneficiary. Even with the aid of the time honored
rule that regulations not clearly contrary to a statute must be sus-
tained,68 these restrictions on withdrawal of earnings are not likely to
be given a very favorable reception by the courts.
Yet another unexpected problem may arise where a corporation
attempts to distribute previously taxed income after a loss year. Since
the amount of the loss reduces the amount available for tax free dis-
tribution, 9 distribution after the loss year will constitute a distribution
first of current year's earnings and then of accumulated earnings, if
any, of a preelection year. The latter distribution will constitute a
6 6 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1959).6 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(d) (ii) (1959). (Emphasis added.)
68 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
69Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(d) (1959).
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dividend or, after preelection earnings have been exhausted, will be
applied against basis (of stock only)-any excess over basis being
considered capital gain.7"
One suggestion advanced for circumventing these problems is to
have the shareholders withdraw the amount of undistributed, already
taxed earnings before the end of each calendar year (to be absolutely
safe) or at least prior to the beginning of a taxable year in which the
shareholders know that the tax option status will be terminated. 71 The
amount of moneys so withdrawn, or some portion thereof, would then
be "loaned" back to the corporation. This procedure would entail two
clear risks: (1) under the Catalina approach the loan itself might effect
a termination of the tax option status; and (2) the Commissioner
might argue that the transaction was lacking in substance.72 At the
very least, therefore, the loans back into the corporation should be in
different amounts than the original withdrawals.
As with other subchapter S special situations, a fully satisfactory
solution to the problems caused by unreasonable regulations remains
to be found.
IV. BAsIs ADJUSTMENTS
Consistent with the partnership provisions,"3 a shareholder's basis
for his stock in a tax option corporation is increased by his share of
undistributed income.74 Likewise, since each shareholder, as a normal
attribute of tax option status, enjoys a pro rata portion of corporate
net operating losses,75 the basis of a shareholder's stock is required to
be reduced, but not below zero, by the shareholder's pro rata share of
the corporate net operating loss. 76  The statute further provides that
after the basis of a shareholder's stock has been reduced to zero, further
70 IT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301 (c).
71 Wood, How To Avoid the Unexpected Tax Problems and Subchapter S, 21
J. TAxATI N 168 (1964). Apparently a mere bookkeeping entry crediting "dividends
payable" would not satisfy the regulations. Some relief is afforded by § 1 of H.R.
9883, already passed by the Senate, see note 52 supra, which would permit distributions
within two and one-half months of the close of a taxable year to be treated as dis-
tributions of that year's income.
72 Cf. United States v. General Geophysical Co., 296 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961).
73 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 705, 733.
7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1376 (a) The statute says that this adjustment is
permitted only to the extent that the previously undistributed amount was included
in gross income, or would have been were an income tax return required, see Treas.
Reg. § 1.1376-1 (1959). The fact that the particular shareholder actually paid no tax
is immaterial. Since all such amounts should be included in gross income, the only
apparent purpose of this provision is to prevent a basis increase with respect to amounts
erroneously omitted from income in earlier years where the statute of limitations
prevents correction of the error.7 5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(b) (1). The loss can also be used in computing
the net operating loss deduction. Just as the basis increase applies regardless of tax
paid, so the decrease applies regardless of "tax benefit." However, there is no pro-
vision comparable to that discussed in note 74 supra, to protect a shareholder who
inadvertently fails to claim a loss in a year barred by the statute.
76 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1376(b) (1).
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losses are applied in reduction of the basis of any indebtedness which
the shareholder might hold against the corporation.
77
Since the shareholder's ordinary loss deduction for his pro rata
share of corporate net operating losses is limited to his combined ad-
justed bases for his stock and indebtedness, 78 it is clear that a share-
holder receives no benefit from losses beyond his investment. Although
the statute and regulations are silent on the point it would seem that
losses should also be allowed to the extent that the shareholder has
guaranteed indebtedness to others.7 ' By way of contrast, the partner-
ship provisions, although they limit a partner's loss to his basis 80 do
permit an increase in that basis for liabilities of the partnership 8' even
though such liabilities may be limited to specific partnership property
with no personal liability upon the partners." The above provisions
give rise to a serious but often overlooked limitation upon the effective
utilization of losses generated by a tax option corporation. As indi-
cated above,83 the corporation's operating losses are deductible by
the shareholders in proportion to their stock ownership. At the same
time the losses allowed are applied against the bases of both the stock
and the loans. The interrelationship of these rules can lead to the
curious situation where one shareholder would be entitled to losses
but has no basis against which to absorb them while another share-
holder has adequate remaining basis but no losses to deduct. Suppose,
for example, that stockholders A and B each contribute 5,000 dollars
to a corporation and each receive one-half of the corporate stock in
return. Shareholder A then loans 10,000 dollars to the corporation.
If the entire 20,000 dollar investment is consumed by deductible ex-
penditures creating a 20,000 dollar loss, A and B would each have
10,000 dollars of the loss allocated to him. However, since B has only
a 5,000 dollar basis for his total investment, his deductible loss would
be limited to 5,000 dollars and the remaining 5,000 dollars of his
share of the loss would never produce a tax benefit. On the other
hand, A, with a 15,000 dollar basis for his total investment, would be
entitled only to a 10,000 dollar deduction.
Important in this regard is a recent ruling 8 4 on shareholder in-
debtedness, the basis of which has been reduced through the application
7 7 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1376(b) (2).
78 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c) (2).
79 Of course, this conclusion assumes that such guarantees do not create a second
class of stock under the doctrine of Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 239 F.
Supp. 794 (D. Ore. 1965).
8o INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 104(d).
81 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 752(a).
8 2 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
83 See note 75 rupra.
84 Rev. Rul. 64-162, 1964-1 Cum. Buu.. 304.
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of the above provisions. As a result of the basis adjustments, when
the face amount of the loan is repaid to the shareholder there will
clearly be a gain. However, this ruling holds that the gain falls under
the general statutory provision dealing with retirement of corporate
indebtedness 85 and, therefore, with certain exceptions not here per-
tinent, the gain would qualify as capital gain. For that matter, assum-
ing that the corporation has no accumulated earnings and profits from
non tax-option years, amounts paid in "retirement" of stock should be
subject to the same treatment 6-- notwithstanding that the redemption
is otherwise nonqualifying. It would appear, especially in view of the
points discussed in the preceding two paragraphs, that, contrary to the
situation of a conventional corporation, the tax option corporation is
generally better advised to be capitalized entirely with capital stock
and no loans. This would solve the Catalina Homes problem while, at
the same time, permitting full utilization of losses and not interfering
with withdrawal of corporate earnings.
V. CAPITAL GAINS
As we have seen, items of income and expense of the tax option
corporation generally do not retain their character in the hands of the
shareholders. One notable exception to this rule occurs in the case
of long term capital gains." Each shareholder is entitled to treat as
long term capital gain that portion of the corporation's long term
capital gain in excess of short term capital losses which the dividends
distributed or deemed distributed ' to him bear to the total dividends
includable in the gross income of all shareholders.
This provision offers an obvious advantage to any corporation
which enjoys a substantial capital gain in one taxable year. 9 However,
it is to be noted that this section does not broadly transmit all capital
gains intact at the shareholder level. Net short term capital gains are
merely included with other income and thus are not available to
absorb the shareholder's capital losses from other sources. Likewise,
since capital losses are deductible by corporations, including subchapter
S corporations,"0 only to the extent of capital gains,"' net capital losses
of a tax option corporation would not be available to offset other
85 INT. R.EV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232.
8 8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(c).
87 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(a).
88 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1373, discussed pp. 689-93 supra.
89 Caveat: If the capital gains are from 'the sale of stock or securities, and such
gains, together with rental, dividend, and other such income exceed 20% of gross in-
come, the tax option status will terminate, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e) (5).
In such a situation, an installment sale might be used to prevent termination.
90 See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
91 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1211(a).
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capital gains earned by a shareholder. There is, of course, a five year
carryforward for corporate capital losses,92 and there would appear to
be nothing to prevent a tax option corporation from using that carry-
over to offset its subsequent capital gains even though such gains are
actually passed on to the shareholders.93 The shareholders would
report as long term capital gain the net amount after application of
the carryforward.
It would also seem clear that the character of gains as section
1231 gains (dealing with real or personal property used in the trade
or business) does not pass through to the shareholders. Thus, a
qualifying corporation might have gain from the sale of section 1231
assets, while the individual shareholder might have had ordinary
losses on similar dispositions or vice versa-he would not be required
or permitted to net the two items against each other.
One unsettled question in this area involves the characterization
of particular assets as "capital assets." Generally speaking, it appears
that a shareholder's "dealer" activities are not imputed to a corporation,
not even to his solely owned corporation.94 There is nothing in the
statute to suggest that the same rule would not apply to a tax option
corporation. However, the regulations, again questionably, provide:
[I]f an electing small business corporation is availed of by
any shareholder or group of shareholders owning a substantial
portion of the stock of such corporation for the purpose of
selling property which in the hands of such shareholder or
shareholders would not have been an asset, gain from the sale
of which would be capital gain, then the gain on the sale of
such property by the corporation shall not be treated as a
capital gain.9'
As in the case of distributions generally,9 6 distributions of capital
gains lose their original character if they are distributed after the
termination of tax option status. In addition, if a corporation earns
a substantial capital gain in one tax year but does not distribute it
until a succeeding year, it may be that, even in the absence of the
termination, the distribution will be taxed as a dividend.9 7  These
9 2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212(a).
93 However, net operating losses incurred prior to election of subchapter S status
are of no avail unless and until the status is terminated. After termination, the cor-
poration may deduct the loss, providing the five year time period, see INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 172, including years of tax option status, has not expired.
94 Ralph E. Gordy, 36 T.C. 855 (1961), acq., 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 4; cf. S. Nicholas
Jacobs, 21 T.C. 165 (1953).
95 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-1(d) (1959).
96 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1375 (d) ; see text accompanying note 66 supra.
97 To the extent of earnings and profits of the later year, see INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1373; Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(d) (1959), this may exceed earnings otherwise
taxable to the shareholder in that year.
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hardships were partly alleviated by the Revenue Act of 1964 which
introduced a provision 9 to the effect that a corporation may distribute
on or before the fifteenth day of the third month following the close
of its taxable year the proceeds of the sale of capital assets or section
1231 assets. Such distributions will be treated as though made on the
last day of the taxable year providing they are made pursuant to a
resolution adopted before the close of the taxable year.
It is apparent that the transmission of capital gains intact to the
shareholders can lead to a situation where a corporation files a "one
shot" election in order to distribute the proceeds of one substantial
capital gain. The Service apparently does not question that this can
be accomplished under existing laws. Election of tax option status
can accomplish this more effectively, and with more certainty, than a
partial liquidation. The tax option route would also be a useful
alternative in a twelve month liquidation 9 where assets are sold on
the installment basis. Generally, to avoid corporate tax, the seller is
obliged to distribute the note. Such distribution in effect negates the
installment basis.'
However, at the request of the Service, legislation has been intro-
duced in the present session of Congress to correct this result.' Under
the proposed bill a corporation would have been denied tax option treat-
ment where in any taxable year it earned a capital gain in excess of
25,000 dollars and such capital gain exceeded the corporation's income
unless the corporation had been a tax option corporation for at least
three years. Although the proposal was not enacted in 1965, the
Treasury is likely to continue to seek the correction. This could create
an undue hardship to corporations not in existence for three years or
for those corporations which, for their own reasons, had not chosen tax
option status until the year of the gain. A better, although less easily
administrable, solution would lie in requiring the taxpayer to demon-
strate that its election was not motivated primarily by its desire to
distribute the proceeds of a capital gain to its shareholders.
CONCLUSION
Subchapter S, enacted to afford tax relief to small businessmen,
has had engrafted upon it congeries of complications, mostly resulting
from regulations and rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, mostly in
effect negating the congressional purpose of tax relief. The complexity
9 8 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(e).
99 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 337.
100 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453(d).
101 H.R. 9883, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
19661
698 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:680
of these regulations has resulted in the legislation's failure to accom-
plish another of its avowed purposes-simplicity, particularly in the
areas of "classes of stock" and withdrawal of earnings. There is thus
an urgent need for correction of many of the principles enunciated by
the regulations. Corrective legislation would be the most effective
method. For the present, however, it is probable that these principles
will be seriously questioned only in litigation. The results of such
litigation will determine what ultimate success the IRS will have in
interpreting the statute in a manner inconsistent with its remedial
purposes.
